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Summary findings
Joining the European Union (EU) is perhaps the key  after accession to the EU can help CEE countries bridge
political and economic objective of Central and Eastern  this income gap.
European  (CEE) countries as they approach the 21st  They have much to gain from implementing policies
century.  that increase investment, support the development of
But how successful the CEE countries are in achieving  human capital, and promote the legal, regulatory, and
this goal depends not only on how well and quickly they  policy framework needed for market mechanisms to
adapt their legal and regulatory systems to EU  funlction.
requirements but on how well and quickly they bridge  f he faster they implement such changes, the faster
the wide income gaps between CEE and EU countries.  they will bridge the income gap between them and the
Using a model and cross-section data to develop  EUI  countries - and the more likely their accession to
estimates, Barbone and Zalduendo investigate how  the EU'  will be successful.
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I.  Introduction
This paper is motivated by the consensus view that the accession to the European Union
(EU) of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries will heavily influence the policies they
implement and that, in turn, this might have important consequences for economic growth. The
accession process is realistically expected to take several years, but the ties with the European
Union  are  likely  to  grow  increasingly  stronger  in  a  number  of  crucial  areas  ranging  from
institutional and political coordination to resource flows.
Key among the many aspects related to EU accession is the per capita income gap that
exists between even the most developed CEEs and the present EU member countries. As Table 1
highlights, CEE countries are very far from the EU average income per capita level . This gap is
likely  to  affect  the EU-CEE  accession negotiations, and  its  gradual  bridging is  a necessary
condition for a sustainable single market, particularly with regard to labor mobility. This will in
tur  require that the average growth rate in CEE countries be higher (substantially higher) than
the EU average.
The growth literature suggests that countries which have similar "environments" converge
in incomes per capita. However, what is relevant for the population of CEE countries is not only
the expectation of convergence taking place but, more importantly, that such convergence occurs as
rapidly as  feasible. Rapid convergence is also  important from  the perspective of  current EU
members. If the European Community is to financially support the reduction in income disparities
between  present  and  future  members,  then  an  estimate  regarding  the  time  frame  for  this
convergence to occur might be extremely helpful for financial and budgetary planning purposes.
Moreover, identifying the forces that enhance convergence may have a catalytic role in defining the
policy requirements for EU accession.
I
The GNP per capita  estimates  in purchasing  power  parity  terms (PPP)  show that  CEE countries  are closer  to the EU
average  than  if we use current  exchange  rate  GDP  per  capita  data.4
Table 1: Evolution of GNP per Capita (in US$) for a Selected Group of CEE Countries.
GNP Data Based on WB Atlas Methodology  GNP-PPP Estimate
1990  1992  1994  1994
Level  Share  Level  Share  Level  Share  Level  Share
of EU  ofEU  of EU  ofEU
Average  Average  Average  Average
Czech  3490  22  2570  14  3200  17  8900  53
Hungary  2910  18  3120  17  3840  20  6080  36
Poland  1700  11  1950  11  2410  13  5480  33
Slovakia  3330  21  2250  12  2470  13  6450  38
Slovenia  9500  59  6770  37  7020  37  6230  37
EU Average  16185  18532  19005  16757
Source: The GNP  data for  1994 in PPP terms  is from  the  1996 World  Development  Report.
Considerable thinking has gone into the elaboration of policy agendas that would allow
sustained medium-term growth. Not surprisingly, given the relative similarity of initial structural
conditions, the prescriptions for most  CEE countries have been fairly similar. They include (i)
strengthening  property  rights  and  the  administration  of  government  services,  including  the
adequacy  of general legal provisions  to functioning  of market mechanisms  (from bankruptcy
laws  to  collateral  legislation);  (ii)  completing  the  privatization  agenda;  (iii)  strengthening
banking regulation and supervision to support the development of capital markets, crucial for the
continued  development  of  private  sector  activities;  (iv)  controlling  the  size  of  the  state
(particularly on the social spending front) and eliminating disincentives against labor in the tax
system; and (v) opening these economies to the flow (both inward as well as outward) of goods
and services to enable a more efficient allocation of resources. Although these policy agendas
(both those implemented as well as those that are still pending) are widely accepted as conducive
to high economic growth rates, little has been done to examine their growth implications. The
aim of this paper, therefore, is to derive lessons from the economic literature that may help to link
these structural reforms with the growth prospects of CEE countries.
We develop a model to examine the issue of bridging of income gaps and derive some
lessons for the EU accession of Central and Eastern European countries. This paper is organized as
follows. We begin by presenting a background discussion on alternative concepts of convergence5
and the key features of the neoclassical growth literature. The model is then briefly described,
highlighting in  particular the  importance of  the  underlying policy  framework in  determining
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economic growth. The following section discusses our empirical results . Section V presents some
convergence and growth exercises, with special emphasis on the implications of different policy
and non-policy scenarios. We conclude by discussing the main policy implications that can be
derived for CEE countries and their accession quest. This paper will build on the findings of the
recent econometric studies of the growth literature (e.g., Barro,  1991) and on the convergence
discussions for CEE countries initiated by Sachs and Warner (1996).
II.  Convergence of Incomes across Countries
First, some definitions. In neoclassical growth models a country's per capita growth rate is
inversely related to its starting level of per capita income. This is known in the growth literature as
the absolute convergence hypothesis, which  hinges on the existence of diminishing returns to
reproducible capital: given sufficient time all  countries should converge to similar per  capita
3
incomes . The hypothesis of absolute convergence implies that rich countries should grow at a
slower rate than poor countries. However, this is not consistent with cross-country data. As shown
in Figure 1, the growth rates per capita (defined in this paper in terms of persons in the labor force)
show little correlation with the starting levels of GDP per capita in a sample of over 80 countries
for the period 1965-89. Other authors, working with different data sets, have also identified similar
patterns (see, for example, Barro,  1991). This contrast between the empirical evidence and the
2
The more formal presentation  of the model  is found in Appendix  I and is followed  in Appendix  2 by a thorough
discussion  of the estimation  results.
3
Some growth  models  treat savings  as exogenous  (e.g., Solow, 1956)  while others  have aimed  at endogeneizing  the
savings  decision  process  by introducing  an optimizing  representative  consumer.  The latter  group  is best  represented  by
Ramsey  (1928),  Caas  (1965),  and Koopmans  (1965).  As Erhlich  (1990)  has highlighted,  the growth  literature  entered  in
the late 1960s  into a dormant  phase  which  was interrupted  by the papers  of Romer  (1986)  and Lucas  (1988).  The so-
called  "new  growth  literature"  is mostly  directed  to providing  an interpretation  for long-run  economic  growth  which  is
not based  on the exogenous  technological  progress  explanation.6
theoretical prediction of the neoclassical growth model has been one of the main objections raised
4
against this literature
Figure 1: Lack of Absolute Convergence.
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Notes: This figure graphs the average  annual growth rate between 1965  and 1989  against the natural  logarithm  of
the initial level of GDP per capita. If the theoretical  prediction  of absolute  convergence  was accurate,  we should
observe  a downward  trend. The countries  included  in this figure are those on which  the estimations  in this paper are
based (see list  in Appendix  3).
Lack of absolute convergence in per capita incomes among countries may be attributed to
their diverse initial conditions, which are also referred to as differences in environment factors.
These include factors that are non-renewable or not changeable, such as resource endowments and
geographical location of a country (also referred as fixed factors), and those that are variable and, in
principle, can be affected by government policy. These differences imply that countries will have
4
The other  main criticism  it has received  relates  to the fact  that growth  in per capita terms occurs  only as a result  of
exogenously  determined  technological  progress, thus providing an  extremely uninteresting  theory of long-run
economic  growth.7
growth rates of GDP determined by their own environments. If we net out from the growth rates of
GDP of any group of countries what can be attributed to these differences in environment (i.e.,
among other, differences in human capital, government policies, consumer preferences, and other
growth determinants), then it has been argued that the hypothesis of poor countries growing more
rapidly than rich countries is once again true. This is known as conditional convergence (see Box 1
S
for a more thorough discussion) .
Box 1: Different  Concepts  of Convergence.
The augmented neoclassical growth model assumes an aggregate production function in which physical capital, human capital
and labor are the only three inputs and where technological progress  is assumed to be exogenously determined. This model
also  assumes that the production  function  exhibits  diminishing  returns to each  individual  input.  The  latter  implies that,
assuming two of the three inputs are fixed, the first units of the non-fixed input enable to produce more units of output than
the following units of that same input.
In this framework, if countries ARE EQUAL in all respects except for their initial level of capital per capita (both physical as
well as human), then poor countries (i.e., those with less capital per capita) get more out of each extra unit of capital per capita
than rich countries. Hence, poor countries grow more rapidly than rich countries and, eventually, the output per capita of each
country is equal. Thus, it is said that absolute convergence takes  place because these countries reach the same capital per
capita (of both types) and output per capita level. This level is known as the steady state and, in the neoclassical growth model,
implies no growth takes place in per capita terms when assuming no technological progress.
However, this concept of convergence seems to have little relation with the existing evidence for different groups of countries.
This is mainly because countries ARE NOT EQUAL and differ in many aspects which are relevant for economic growth. For
example,  it may  well be the case that two countries  have  different  savings  rates,  different  rates of population  growth,  different
government  policies,  different consumer  tastes,  or different production  technologies.  These differences  are precisely  what
determine  the lack  of a clear trend in Figure 1 and imply that each country  has a different  steady  state level.  In this context,
the concept  of conditional  convergence  suggests  that the country  that finds  itself proportionately  farther  away from its OWN
steady  state will  grow faster  than the country  that is proportionately  closer  to its OWN  steady  state.  This enables,  for example,
rich countries  with very  high savings  rates  to grow  faster  than poor countries  with very  low savings  rates.
The  evidence on  convergence among  current  members  of  the  European Community
suggests that the countries in CEE (and their regions) might converge, in time, to the EU average
income per capita level. This seems to be also supported by the experience of some late-comers into
EU  membership. For example, with the exception of the  slowdown observed in  recent years,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have seen a significant decrease in their own gaps with the EU
average (see Table 2). As the regional convergence studies of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have
shown, convergence does occur whenever the environments are similar. The CEE countries should
S
In this paper we do not examine the implications of fixed factors and center the analysis on those which are variable.
For an analysis that evaluates natural resources and geographical location see Sachs and Warner (1995).8
then expect income convergence to take place as they implement policies in tune with EU accession
requirements. However, it is also the case that convergence is slow. As shown in Table 2, the four
poorest current EU member countries have reduced only by approximately one-half their initial
difference with the EU average income per capita during the last 34 years.
Table 2: Evolution of GDP per Capita (in US$) among EU Member Countries.
Summers and Heston Data - Mark 5.6  GNP-PPP Estimate
1960  1970  1980  1990  1994
Level  Level  Level  Level  Level
EU High  8530  Sweden  12018  Sweden  13809  Sweden  16106  Sweden  20270  Belgium
EU Average  5700  8484  10793  13168  16757
EU Low  2188  Portugal  3853  Portugal  5723  Portugal  7565  Greece  10930  Greece
Level  Share  Level  Share  Level  Share  Level  Share  Level  Share
ofEU  ofEU  of EU  of EU  of EU
Average  Average  Average  Average  Average
Greece  2414  42  4824  57  6662  62  7565  57  10930  65
Ireland  3918  69  5939  70  8056  75  10837  82  13550  81
Portugal  2188  38  3853  45  5723  53  8487  64  11970  71
Spain  3620  64  6813  80  8521  79  10802  82  13740  82
Note: The EU Average is an unweighted mean of all current EU members.
Source: The GNP data for 1994 in PPP terms is from the 1996 World Development Report.
III.  The Model
* Can we make reasonable guesses as to the time it will take CEE countries to converge to a
certain threshold; say, for example, 75  percent of the EU average income per capita level?
* To what degree can government policy influence the time frame  during which income gaps are
bridged?
* What is the impact of different policy  scenarios for  an economy's average long-run growth
rates?
To answer these questions we develop and estimate a growth model for a large cross-
section  of countries,  and  we  then  apply the  results  to  CEE  countries.  Following  the above9
discussion  on conditional and  absolute convergence, we recognize that significant differences
exist between CEE and EU countries and that, therefore, a model based solely on the concept of
absolute convergence would inadequately  address the bridging of  income gaps between CEE
countries and the European Community.  Hence, the model presented in this section will allow
for differences in environments among countries, thus implying an analysis based on the concept
of conditional convergence.
Box 2: Data Used in the Econometric Estimation.
To estimate  our growth equation we use cross-section  data from the version  Mark 5.6 of the Penn World  Tables  compiled  by
Summers  and Heston  (1991).  This  data is based  on the United  Nations  International  Comparison  Project  which aims  at providing
comparable  national  accounts  information  by using  detailed  price comparisons  for over one-hundred  products.  The prices are
then used to convert  local currency  country  data into a common  currency  unit, therefore  enabling real quantity comparisons
across  countries.  This  data is available  from the NBER  web site.
From  this database  we use the GDP per capita  for the years 1960,  1965,  and 1989,  defined  as persons  in the labor  force  (i.e., the
economically  active population),  and the share of GDP assigned to investment  in physical capital, calculated  as the annual
average  share for the period  between 1960  and 1989.  The rate of growth  of the labor  force is the average  corresponding  to the
period  between 1960  and 1989  and is calculated  from the annual  data  on population  and GDP per  capita  for that period,  the latter
both in terms of persons in the labor force as well as in terms of total population.  We assume that the rate of technological
progress  and the depreciation  rate are the same  for each country,  the sum of which  is set equal to five  percent  a year.  Setting  the
sum of technological  progress  and depreciation  rate at 5 percent is in line with  other studies,  such as Mankiw,  Romer,  and Weil
(1992)  and King  and Rebelo  (1990).  The  data on human  capital  is based  on the educational  attainment  level calculated  by Barro
and Lee (1993).  Of the data they have  compiled  we use the mean  for three  years  --1975, 1980,  and 1985--  of the average  number
of years of education  of the total  population.
We assume that output in any country i is produced according to the following production
function
Yi = Ki'  Hip (A N)'a  . [1]
In this equation Y is output (GDP), K represents physical capital, H is human capital, A denotes
6
the country's level of technology, and N is the number of persons in the labor force .Both ax  and
6
The introduction of human capital into a production function with constant returns to scale is similar to viewing
capital as a broadly defined input (i.e., one which  includes both human as well as physical capital). This has also
been referred by many authors as a Solow-augmented model (see, among others, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, and
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992). While a model based on this production function would still imply that long-run
economic growth is exogenously determined, our aim is to analyze (conditional) convergence. Endogenous growth
models have little to say on this  topic since their main  goal is to provide an  interpretation as to why countries
continue to grow indefinitely without relying on the exogenously given technological progress explanation. In this
sense, convergence is not the usual focus of these models.10
1  are between zero and one and represent, respectively, the share of each capital type in total
output. The sum of these two parameters is strictly less than unity and technological progress is
assumed to be labor-augmenting.
Physical capital and human capital are assumed to accumulate in similar fashion. The
dynamic equation for physical capita! is given by
K  =  Sk  Y - a  K  [2]
where  K is the change of the physical capital stock at any point in time, sk is the share of output
dedicated to the accumulation of this type of capital and  a  is its depreciation rate. Similarly,
human capital accumulates according to
H  =  Sh  Y - a  H  [3]
where  H is the change of the human capital stock at any point in time, sh is the share of output
assigned to the accumulation of this input and the rest of the notation  follows the definitions
already presented.  For simplicity  we assume  the  same rate of  depreciation  for physical  and
human capital.
As discussed in  Box 2, we use  as the share of GDP assigned to the  accumulation of
physical capital the data on gross domestic investment in the economy as a percentage of GDP.
For the share of GDP allocated to the accui lulation of human capital we will use as a proxy the
average level of this input in the economy. We also assume that the policy framework (i.e., the
existing  economic  policy,  regulatory,  and  legal  features  of  the  economy)  is  essential  in
determining the effectiveness of human capital in the production process. As one example, the
economic performance in recent decades of the formerly centrally planned economies of CEE is
a good representation of why high levels of human capital, or of investment in this input, do not
in themselves  ensure  long-term  growth. This  approach  is also  consistent  with the  results of
empirical studies which introduce policy indicators as explanatory variables in growth equations11
(see Barro,  1991, and  Sachs and  Warner, 1996). More  specifically, we define  investment in
human capital as
Sh  =  y h  Z°  [4]
where y is a proportionality factor which will be embodied in the constant of the equation we
estimate and h is the stock of human capital in effective labor units (i.e., the number of human
capital units per person scaled by the economy's  technology level). The variable Z is an index
that represents the policy framework of the economy and is limited to the closed interval [1,5].
The parameter 4 has no special restrictions beyond being strictly positive.
We can write the model represented by equation [1] through [3] in its intensive form (i.e.,
7
in per capita termns  rather than total terms) .Log-linearizing the derived growth equation, solving
for the steady state, and using equation [4] (see Appendix 1 for the full derivation), we may write
the growth equation to be estimated (see Appendix 2 for a more thorough discussion) as
GR  = XO  +  X In  y(O)  + X2In Sk + x31n h+ X4In  Z  -(X2  + X3)  In (a+n+a)+E  [5]
7
We define  the growth  rate  of output  as GR=(ln 9(t)-In y(O))/t where y is the level of output  per capita,  net of the
level of technology  in the economy,  and t is the number  of years. Also,  notice  that we have assumed  that the index
of policies  Z affects only human  capital and not physical  capital (see equation [4]). Recognizing  that this might  be
interpreted  as a drawback  of the model, we wish to make a few comments  in defense  of our assumption.  First, our
reasoning  is that the index  Z affects  the effectiveness  of "stocks"  of inputs.  This allows  to argue that  as the index Z
has become  higher in CEE  countries,  the "existing"  stocks  of inputs  have become  more  productive.  Second,  human
capital should be thought  to represent  not only  the quality  of the labor force, but the entrepreneurial  ability of firm
managers  and/or owners.  As a result, a high  value for the index Z enables  a more  efficient  "production  process",  but
the intrinsic  capabilities  of the existing  stocks  of inputs  are still  constant.  Thus, ceteris  paribus,  a machine  designed
to produce 10 screws per time period is still capable of producing 10 screws. If it accomplishes  or not the
production capacity for which it was "designed" will depend on factors which are exogenous  to the machine
capabilities.  Finally, the reader should also acknowledge  that we are bound by the theoretical foundation  of our
model. If we opted for assuming  that the index Z also affects  physical  capital,  we must first find a way to introduce
such restriction.  However,  the resulting  growth equation  would still result in an equation  similar  to [5]. The sole
difference  would reside with the interpretation  of the coefficients Xy,  and X4 being estimated.  Altematively,  we
would need data on the stock of physical  capital which has its own added difficulty  due to its limited availability
and poor quality.  In sum, our belief  that we should  only "penalize"  the stocks  of inputs,  the interpretation  of human
capital as a broadly  defined  input  (i.e., which  also includes  entrepreneurial  ability),  and  the fact  that the implications
for the growth  equation  are mostly  inconsequential,  lead us to maintain  our assumption  that  the index  Z affects  only
the effectiveness  of human capital.  While  we acknowledge  that their might still be room for disagreement  as to the
merits  of this assumption,  we wish to conclude  by stating that the apparent  asymmetry  in our treatment  of physical
and human  capital  may be also viewed  as the result of the intrinsic  complementarity  between  these  two inputs.12
where  the  different  coefficients  Xo,  Xi,  X2,  X3 ,  and  X4  are  non-linear  functions  of  the
parameters of the model and GR is the average annual long-run growth rate.
An obvious difficulty in estimating equation [5] is how to define Z, which is assumed to
represent  the  policy  framework  of  an  economy  (i.e.,  a  broadly  defined  economic  policy,
regulatory,  and  legal  framework of the economy).  Our priors  suggest that  it should  include,
among other variables, indicators of monetary policy, fiscal policy, degree of openness, rule of
law, and degree of price system distortion. The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) constructed by
Johnson and Sheehy (1996) contains these indicators. There are a total of ten variables in the IEF
which could be grouped by pairs into the five mentioned indicator types. The variables related to
monetary/banking  policy  are  the  annual  average  inflation  rate  between  1985-93  and  the
existence, or not, of restrictions to opening banks (with emphasis on restrictions for foreigners).
The data on fiscal policy are based on a measure of the tax burden and the size of government
consumption, both measured as a share of GDP. The indicators on price system distortion relate
to the existence of price and wage controls and an estimate of the size of black market activities.
The concept of rule of law defines the presence of corruption practices in the administration of
government services and the significance, or lack of, regulatory frameworks (e.g., simplicity of
licensing procedures). Finally, the measure of openness of an economy is assessed according to
the average level of tariffs and the restrictions on capital flows and foreign investment. From all
8
these indicators an average is constructed which we then use in our regression estimates .
Although  the IEF constitutes  an interesting aggregation of the policy, regulatory,  and
legal framework in which economic activities take place, the use of the IEF index is not without
its own difficulties. Two limitations of this index need to be highlighted. First, the IEF index has
been  calculated  for  recent  years  and,  therefore,  is  incapable  of  representing  accurately  the
economic policy and legal framework for the complete period of study (i.e., the growth rates
between 1965-89). This has already been noted by Sachs and Warner (1996). A more ambitious
8
The IEF  index has already been used in the past by Sachs  and Warner  (1996).  However,  our use of the index is in
the context of a theoretical  model where the structural  framework  represented  by the IEF is assumed  to play an
important  role in determining  the effectiveness  of human  capital  in the production  process.13
endeavor would be to construct an index Z which would incorporate the benefits of more "time
series information", a task which we partially pursue with a modification we introduce into the
IEF index (see Box 3). Second, we believe the index is at times too  loosely and subjectively
defined,  thus  becoming  prone  to  arbitrary  measurement  errors  of  uncertain  distribution.  In
working with this index we assume the authors were closely involved in the assignment of values
for each country. However, we would feel more at ease if the index could be put together with a
higher  degree  of  reliance, when  possible,  on  quantifiable  information.  Notwithstanding  the
above, we find its emphasis on the policy, regulatory and legal framework of an economy (i.e.,
monetary policy, fiscal policy, rule of law, price system distortion, and degree of openness) well
founded and aimed in the right direction.14
Box 3: Methodology  Used to Construct  the Modified  IEF Index.
We modify twenty percent of the index constructed by Johnson and Sheehy (I 996) by replacing the two components that relate
to  the  degree  of  openness  of the  economy  (i.e.,  trade  and  capital  flows).  The  original  IEF  index  emphasizes  only  the
consequences of tariffs to evaluate the openness to international trade. We will replace this by considering not only the average
level of tariffs, but  also the share of industrial output affected by quantitative restrictions. Also, the original IEF evaluates a
country's  openness to  capital flows  by examining  the degree  to which  each  country  interferes or  not  with foreign  direct
investment. This evaluation is mostly based on conclusions derived from an analysis of the legal and regulatory framework of
the country.  We assume a more market oriented, albeit still limited, methodology to measure capital movements by centering
only on the existence of premiums in exchange rates as represented by the difference between the market and official exchange
rate. Thus, our degree of openness of the economy has three components (i.e., tariffs, QRs, and exchange rate premiums), each
with a weight of one third in the final index representing the degree of openness of the economy, and the period under study
corresponds  to  the  1970s  and  1980s.  Several  sources  are  used,  among  them  Sachs  and  Warner  (1995)  and  the  IMF's
International  Financial  Statistics.  The  main  advantage  of  this  modified  IEF  index  is that  it  contains  more  "time  series
information" than the original series compiled by Johnson and Sheehy.
To construct the index, a value in the range I to 5 is assigned to each of the three indicators of openness previously mentioned
and a weighted average of the mean of these three indexes and the remaining eighty percent of the IEF index is calculated. The
table  in this box  represents how the  index values were assigned for  an economy's  degree of  openness. To summarize,  the
countries with a value between the mean and the median for each of the three indicators is assigned an index value of 3. Those
countries with indicator values between zero and half the distance to the median (which happens to be the smallest between the
latter and the mean) are assigned a value of 5. From there to the median a value of 4 is given to the complying countries. The
value of 2 is assigned to countries that are in between the mean value and the upper bound reported in the table below. The index
value of one is reserved to those countries which register the worst openness indicators.
Intervals Used to Assign Index Values to Openness Indicators.
Value  Average Share  Average Share of Industrial  Premiums in the
Assigned  of Tariffs  Output Subject to QRs  Exchange Rate Market
5  x < 0.065  x < 0.04  x S 0.05
4  0.065￿x<0.13  0.04￿x<0.1  0.05sx<0.1
3  0.135x<0.17  0.1Sx<0.21  0.1Sx<0.25
2  0.17Sx<0.7  0.21 sx<0.5  0.25sx<0.5
1  0.7Sx  0.5Sx  0.5S￿x
Minimum Value  0.000  0.000  0.000
Median  0.133  0.103  0.115
Mean  0.174  0.214  0.426
Maximum Value  1.319  0.888  8.01515
IV. Estimation Results
The goal of our econometric estimation is to gauge how much of the growth rate of a
cross-section of countries might be explained by the initial level of GDP per capita (i.e., pure and
simple absolute convergence) and, since we allow for diverse environments across countries, by
the share of investment in physical capital, the stock  of human capital, the policy framework
within which economic activities take place (i.e., the IEF index previously discussed), and the
rate of growth of the labor force. In effect, these environment factors  determine different steady
state levels for each country and will be referred in the rest of this paper as growth determinants.
To  achieve this  goal we regress the annual average  growth rates of per capita GDP (in  PPP
terms) on the four growth determinants mentioned above and the initial level of output per capita.
9
The econometric estimation follows the specification described in equation [5] . In Appendix 3
10
we present the list of countries included in each regression  and the corresponding data  . The
period under study is in all cases 1965-89.
In Table 3 we present the average values of our five coefficient estimates (i.e.,  Xo, Xi,
X 2 ,  X3 ,  and  X 4 ).  From these estimates we derive the implied values of (p, c,  D and 4 using,
respectively, equation [viii] and equation [xi] of Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. Recall that  cx  and ,B
are the shares of both capital types in total output and 4  is a parameter that affects the policy
framework of the economy  . Also, from Appendix I we know that  p is the speed with which a
9
A total of eight different  regressions  are estimated  in this paper, half of which  are based on the original  IEF index
while the other half use the modified IEF index discussed in Box 3. A thorough  discussion of the estimation
procedure  is presented  in Appendix  2 of this paper.
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We begun  with a total sample of 100 countries.  However, as can be observed in Appendix 3, this number  got
reduced  to slightly over 80 since  some data was not available  for our original  sample,  particularly  that on the level
of educational  attainment.  Note that CEE countries  have been excluded  from the econometric  estimation.  Also, we
modify  in all regressions  the data from Johnson  and Sheehy  by inverting  the index  ordering  so that higher numbers
--the range is from I to 5-- indicate  less government  intervention  or a higher degree  of economic  freedom.  The goal
of this modification  is to make  this index  consistent  with  equation  [4].
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Note that the sum of a  and a  in Table 3 leads  to a share of capital,  in its two types,  equal to approximately  60
percent  of total output.  This is consistent  with the finding  that high shares  of capital are required  to explain slower
speeds of convergence  in neoclassical  growth models.  In this respect,  the usual shares  of capital of close to 30-4016
country converges from its current per capita level to its own steady state level (i.e., the level at
12
which growth of output per capita ceases)
Table 3: Coefficient Estimates and Implied Values.
Xo  Xi  x2  X3  X4
Coefficient Estimates  0.08787  -0.01895  0.01697  0.00976  0.02504
Standard  Errors  0.018  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.008
T-Statistic  4.72  -6.39  3.98  2.48  2.99
Adjusted  R Squared  0.491
Standard  Error  of Regression  0.014
F-Statistic  21.34
Implied  Values  0.02527  0.37158  0.21361  2.56559
- What are the main conclusions one may derive  from the estimation results?
As shown in Figure  2, using the estimation results we can now show that there is an
inverse relationship between the initial level of GDP per capita and the net growth rate of GDP
per capita. Thus, the hypothesis of convergence holds if we first subtract from the growth rates
what  may be  explained by a  country's  own environment factors (i.e., the mentioned growth
determinants). In sum, the theoretical prediction of decreasing returns to reproducible capital is
13
rescued through the interpretation of conditional convergence
percent  were  shown  to be insufficient  to explain  slow  convergence  processes  (for a discussion  on this topic  see,
among  others,  Barro  and Sala-i-Martin,  1995).
12
We assume our estimates adopt the values corresponding to a restricted two-stage least square estimation that
uses the modified IEF index; that is the  last column of Table A-2 in Appendix 2.  Other estimation results and a
more thorough discussion are also presented in this appendix.
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Figure 2 also reports the  observations for Guyana and  Zambia which are evidently  off the trend of all other
countries. We opted for keeping both of them in our estimations, though this implies on average a reduction of the
coefficient of multiple determination from  approximately 0.6 to 0.5 (i.e., our equation explains 50 percent of the17
Also,  the speed  of convergence  (T is estimated  in our  regressions  at approximately  0.0248.
That  is,  each  year  there  is  a  reduction  equivalent  to  approximately  2.5  percentage  points  in  a
country's  own  income  per  capita  gap (i.e.,  the difference  between  the  initial  income  per  capita  of
a  country  and  its  own  steady  state  level).  As  shown  in  Table  4,  our  estimate  for  q  falls  in
between  those  of other  authors  and implies  that reducing  in one-half  a country's  own  income  per
capita  gap will take approximately  28 years.
Figure 2: Presence of Conditional Convergence.
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Notes:  This  figure  graphs  the  average  growth  rate  between  1965  and  1989,  NET  of  the  value  predicted  by  all
explanatory  variables  other  than  the  natural  logarithm  of the initial  level  of GDP  per  capita,  against  this  initial GDP
per capita.  The  countries  included  in this figure  are those  on which  the estimations  in this paper  are based.
observed  growth  rates if we  include  Guyana  and Zambia  and  over 60 percent  if we  exclude  them).  Future  research
will  aim  at  excluding  these  two  countries  from  our  estimation.  Nonetheless,  it  is  worth  highlighting  that  the
coefficient  of  multiple  determination  when  we  include  these  countries  is still  among  the  highest  that  have  been
reported  in growth  equations  for  a cross-section  of countries.18
Table 4: Speed of Convergence Coefficients.
Barro  Barro and  Mankiw,  Sachs and  Barbone and
and Lee.  Sala-i-Martin.  Romer, and Weil.  Warner.  Zalduendo.
Value of q  0.0286  0.0302  0.0178  0.0168  0.0248
Years required to reduce in fifty percent  a country's  own gap between the  initial level and the initial steady state
level of GDP per capita:
24 years  23 years  39 years  41 years  28 years
The implications of each of the other coefficient estimates are also extremely interesting
and are summarized in Table 5. For example, increasing by 2.5 percentage points the share of
investment in GDP will lead to an increase of approximately one fourth of one percent in the
annual growth rate. Similarly, increasing by one year the average number of years of education
of the adult population implies an increase of close to  0.1 of a percentage point in the annual
growth rate. An increase in the index that represents the economy's policy framework (i.e., the
original or the modified IEF Index) by one half of a point --say from 4 to 4.5-- results in an
increase of the average annual growth rate of approximately 0.2 of a percentage point. Finally,
increasing the fertility rates (i.e., a + n +  a)  by  0.002, say from 0.054 to  0.056, leads to  a
reduction in the growth rate of approximately 0.1 of a percentage point a year. Thus, increasing
the labor force size leads to a reduction of the per capita growth rate since it lowers the per capita
levels of each input. As expected, the implications of our growth determinants (i.e., the signs of
our coefficient estimates) are the appropriate ones. Also, notice that these variations in growth
rates are very significant when compounded over long periods of time. For example, growing at
two extra percentage points a year allows output per capita to increase by slightly more than 80
14
percent during a thirty year period
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By the term fertility we are referring to those factors that lead to variations in the labor force size. While it may
well reflect the country's  own mortality and natality rates, it is also related to other factors such as the evolution of
the  share in labor force participation of different  gender groups  and the country's  own cultural background and
degree of development.19
Table 5: Coefficient Estimates and Implications for Economic Growth Rates.
Change in the Value  Change in Annual
of Growth Determinants  Growth Rates
Investment as a Share of GDP:  + 2.5 percentage points  IMPLIES  +  0.25 percent growth.
Human Capital:  +  I year of adult education  IMPLIES  +  0.1O  percent growth.
Policy Framnework:  + 0.5 in the Index Z  IMPLIES  + 0.20 percent growth.
Labor Force Growth Rate:  + 0.02 percentage points  IMPLIES  - 0.10 percent growth.
V.  Convergence and Growth: What Lies Ahead for CEE Countries?
We  have  estimated  a  theoretical  model  using  cross-section  data.  As  previously
mentioned, we have allowed for the existence of differences across countries which go beyond
different initial levels of output per capita. Thus, the performance of a country also depends on
its own environment factors  or, as we have also called them, its own growth determinants. In
sum,  convergence and  growth will  depend on  the level  of human  capital, the  features of  a
country's  policy framework, the rate of growth of the labor force (or "fertility" rates, see Box 2
for a  discussion on this  data),  and the investment level  on physical capital. In particular,  to
thoroughly examine how these factors affect convergence and growth for a given country, it is
important to analyze how they compare with those of other countries. For example, in our case,
the "EU average country" is a reasonable baseline. We assume the "EU average country" is one
which maintains the current EU Average growth determinant values.20
Table 6: Growth Determinants for CEE Countries and Other Country Groups.
Annual Average  GNP per  Average  Human  1996 Modified  Average
Growth Rates  Capita  Investment  Capital  Structural  Fertility Rates
1965-89  1994  as % of GDP  1985  Framework  1984-89
PPP Estimates  1994-95  (i.e., Index Z)  (i.e., a + 6 + n)
Fastest Growing Economies  6.2%  8058  34.3%  6.73  4.26  6.4%
Fast Growing Economies  5.4%  10038  33.6%  5.66  3.71  7.0%
EU Highest  1.8%  20270  26.5%  10.33  4.22  5.0%
EU Average  2.5%  16757  18.2%  7.70  3.82  5.3%
EU Low  4.1%  10930  13.0%  3.83  3.27  5.8%
Czech Republic  n/a  8900  25.7%  n/a  4.00  5.4%
Hungary  n/a  6080  22.0%  10.75  3.10  4.9%
Poland  n/a  5480  17.1%  8.41  2.95  5.6%
Slovakia  n/a  6450  25.8%  n/a  3.05  5.5%
Slovenia  n/a  6230  21.6%  n/a  2.65  5.3%
CEE Average  n/a  6628  22.4%  9.58  3.15  5.3%
Notes:  Fastest  Growing  Economies  includes  Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Singapore,  and  Taiwan.  The  Fast Growing
Economies refers to Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand. The notation n/a stands for data not available. The
data on human  capital is from Barro  and Lee (1993).  No  equivalent human capital data is available for Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We use for these countries the average from Hungary and Poland. The data on
investment  corresponds for all non-CEE  countries to the  average for  1993-94 and  for all CEE countries to the
average for 1994-95. The GNP per capita data for 1994 is from the 1996 World Development Report. The Index of
Policy Z for CEE countries is based on the original IEF Index.
Using the econometric results discussed in Section IV, we examine how CEE countries
will perform under different scenarios. More specifically, we first calculate the number of years
it takes for CEE countries to reach, under different scenarios, 75 percent of the GDP per capita of
the  EU  average  country.  This  threshold  is  picked  since  most  EU  structural  funds  allocate
resources to regions which are below it. We then perform  some growth exercises and discuss
how much faster the growth rate of GDP per capita for CEE countries can be relative to the EU
15
average country, once again assuming different policy scenarios
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The above discussion on convergence and growth paths would be  incomplete if we did not highlight its three
main weaknesses. First, the estimated model in this paper  is based on a  log-linearization of the  original paths of
physical and human capital. While this allows to obtain closed form solutions for the dynamics of the model out of
the steady state, these dynamics are valid only in the  "neighborhood" of this  steady state. In practice, numerical
solutions to our dynamic equations would show that the  speed of  convergence would decrease as a country gets
closer to its own  steady state rather than  the constant  speed of convergence  p  on which  we currently base our
analysis. Second, while we present results for different convergence and growth exercises, we assume in each of21
Before discussing in detail our results, we begin first by presenting in Table 6 the key
values  of environment  factors  (or growth  determinants)  for different  groups  of countries.  These
values will constitute the basis on which our convergence and growth exercises are built. Table 6
is also interesting in that it appears to show that convergence has taken place among present EU
member  countries.  For example,  the average  growth  rate  has been  very  low  for the  richest
country (1.8 percent a year) and very high for the poorest country (4.1 percent a year), with the
EU average settling at approximately  2.5 percent a year. Also, the countries characterized by
high rates of investment are among the best  growth performers. Though  the average level of
education of the adult population is not very high among these countries, it is accompanied by a
high index value for the "policy index" in the economy (i.e., the Index Z). Finally, it is important
to highlight that the index Z of CEE countries is in many cases too low relative to the current
average for the European Community. As mentioned before, we assume the EU average country
is one which maintains the current EU Average growth determinant values presented in Table 6.
Years for Convergence
We discuss in this sub-section the exercises that address how many years it will take to
converge to 75 percent of the EU average income per capita level for five CEE countries (i.e.,
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Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) under different scenarios  . We use
for these calculations equation [xii] of Appendix 4. This equation highlights that the convergence
time frame will depend on how the growth determinants of any CEE country compare to those of
the EU average country. The results are summarized in Table 7.
them that the determinants  of steady state levels remain constant, an extremely unlikely assumption.  In this
framework,  if one were to take the discussed results at face value, it is entirely possible for an economy  to be
beyond its golden rule level of capital per capita (i.e., the level that allows to maximize  consumption  per capita),
thus falling  in the so-called  dynamically  inefficient  region.  Finally,  the Lucas' critique  would  apply with full-force
to these convergence  and growth exercises. In presenting our results we are fully aware of these limitations.
However,  given  the slow  convergence  of the poorest  current  EU members  during  the last 34 years  (see Table  2), we
find our results  consistent  with that evidence  and enlightening  as to the policy  direction  that CEE  countries  should
follow.
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This sub-section  builds  mostly on what we could call "combination  scenarios"  (i.e., all growth determinants  are
set at levels  different  from those currently  in place in each CEE country).  By contrast,  in Appendix  5 we examine
the individual impact of these growth determinants.22
Table 7: Years for Convergence. Combination Scenarios.
Current  CEE  EU  EU  EU  Optimal  Optimal
Trend  Mean  Low  Average  Iligh  GDI=25%  GDI=30%
Czech  Rep.  15  28  31  12  11  10
I[ungary  41  46  50  22  20  18
Poland  ###  50  ###  54  24  22  20
Slovakia  41  44  ###  47  20  19  17
Slovenia  91  45  ###  49  21  20  18
Note:  ###  denotes  no  convergence  and  implies  that  the  country  never  reaches  75  percent  of  the  EU  average  level  of
income  per  capita  (i.e.,  the  steady  state  of  this  country  is  below  this  threshold).
Scenario  Assumptions:  In  all  scenarios  the  EU  "average"  country  to  which  CEE  countries  are  converging  is
assumed  to  behave  as  dictated  by  the  EU  Average  values  presented  in  Table  6.  The  column  titled  Current  Trend
assumes  each  CEE  country  maintains  the  same  growth  determinant  values  that  it currently  has.  The  second  column
assumes  the  growth  determinants  are  equal  to  the  current  average  for  the  five  CEE  countries  being  examined.  The
next  three  columns  assume  CEE  countries  behave,  respectively,  as  determined  by  the  EU  Low,  EU  Average,  and
EU  High  growth  determinants.  Note  also  that  the  scenario  based  on  the  EU  Average  is  equivalent  to  the  concept  of
absolute  convergence  since  both  the  CEE  countries  as  well  as  the  EU  average  country  adopt  the  EU  Average  growth
determinant  values  (i.e.,  we  end  up  using  equation  [xiii]  of  Appendix  4).  Finally,  the  two  columns  titled  Optimal
represent  the  results  for  an  ambitious  set  of  targets.  These  are  (i)  a "policy  framework"  index  at  the  maximum  of  4.7
which  corresponds  to  the  value  for  Hong  Kong;  (ii)  no  labor  force  growth,  as  is  approximately  the  case  for
Hungary;  and  (iii)  a level  of  human  capital  equal  to  the  EU  High.  In  addition,  each  of  these  two  columns  assumes  a
different  investment  level,  respectively,  25  and  30  percent  of  GDP.
* What main conclusions can be reached from the results in Table 7?
First,  CEE countries  are  far  from  being  on  a  path  of  rapid  convergence.  For  most
countries convergence to the set threshold would take between 4 and 9 decades if they maintain
their current growth determinants. The sole exceptions are Poland, for which convergence would
never be  accomplished, and  the Czech  Republic,  which converges in  about  15 years.  These
results are presented in the column titled Current Trend in Table 7 and may be viewed as the
benchmark against which all other scenarios must be evaluated (see Table 6 and notes to Table 7
for the actual growth determinant values being assumed in each of the convergence exercises we
now discuss). Notice that using the growth determinant values of the EU average country (i.e.,
the column titled EU Average) would worsen the performance of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and  Slovakia.  This  is  a  surprising  result  since,  even  though  transition  economies  have
implemented far-reaching reforms, they still lag far behind many EU member countries in terms
of the "policy framework"  of the economy as well as other positive determinants for growth.23
However,  these three  countries have  high  levels  of  investment  (relative to  the  EU average
country) that  enable them to  compensate for other shortcomings. By contrast, for Poland and
Slovenia the number of years required to converge to the mentioned threshold will be lower if
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they implement  policies  equal to  those  of  the  EU average  country  . Notice  also  that  other
scenarios are less promising. For example, if CEE countries were to adopt growth determinant
values lower than those presently  in place  (e.g., those that correspond  to the EU Low), then
neither of the CEE countries which we discuss in this paper would converge to the set threshold.
Finally,  and  on a  more promising  note, there  is still  significant headroom  above the
growth determinants of the EU average country. In this regard, the challenge for CEE countries is
to  implement  policies  which  are  less  intrusive  than those  of the  EU  average  country, thus
providing an environment supportive of the effectiveness of human capital in the production
process. Also, these countries should adopt policies (both macro as well as sectoral) conducive to
high investment levels. In doing so, they can significantly curtail the number of years it takes to
converge to a certain target level. Human capital development is also a key area for government
policy. In particular, it should stress not only higher levels of education for the future working
generation, but also greater emphasis should be given to enhancing the skills of those displaced
workers that have emerged as a result of the transition from central planning to market-based
economies. In sum, the higher the investment level, the higher the Index Z, the lower the labor
force growth rate, and the higher the human capital level, the more rapidly will convergence take
place. Comprising all of the above, we present three "combination" scenarios: the EU High and
two Optimal scenarios with, respectively, an investment level of 25 percent and 30 percent of
GDP. These scenarios are constructed using the assumptions described in the notes to Table 7
and, as can be clearly observed, they significantly reduce the years required for convergence to
take place.
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Slovenia's poor performance  is affected by an extremely  low value of the index Z (the lowest  among the five
CEE countries being examined).  However,  this should be expected  to rapidly change as the economy pursues  a
more  ambitious  reform  agenda,  therefore  significantly  affecting  our convergence  estimates.24
* What role does the policy framework  of an economy playfor  economic growth?
As shown in Table 8, the index that represents the policy framework of the economy has
an important role in ensuring not only the existence of convergence to the set threshold of 75
percent of the EU average income per capita, but also the number of years in which it will take
place.  For example, while for  Poland convergence is presently not  expected to take  place, a
higher value of this index will allow this country to converge. Also, most other countries may see
the number of years required for convergence cut in more than half if the index is sufficiently
high. As described in Section III, this index represents the policy framework of the economy and
covers a broad range of issues; among them a country's  monetary policy, fiscal policy, degree of
openness, rule of law, and degree of price system distortion. The current value of this index for
most CEE countries is well below that of the EU average country, which currently stands at 3.8
points (see Table 9). The sole exception is the Czech Republic whose current average is higher
than the EU Average. Also, three of the components of the index for CEE countries are well
below  those  of  the EU  average  country.  These  are the  degree  of openness  component,  the
indicators of monetary and financial/banking sector policies, and the degree of distortion of the
18
price system
Table 8: Years for Convergence for Different Policy Framework Scenarios.
Current Status  Scenarios
Index  Years  for  3.00  3.50  4.00  4.33  4.67  5.00
Value  Convergence
Czech  Rep.  4.00  15  25  18  15  13  12  11
Hungary  3.10  41  44  33  27  25  23  21
Poland  2.95  ###  ###  71  49  42  37  33
Slovakia  3.05  41  42  31  26  23  21  20
Slovenia  2.65  91  54  37  30  27  24  23
Note: ### denotes  no convergence  and implies  that  the country  never reaches 75 percent  of the EU average  level of
income per capita (i.e., the steady state of this country is below this threshold).
Scenario  Assumptions:  In  all  scenarios  it  is  assumed  that  CEE  countries  maintain  all  their  current  growth
deterninant  values except that corresponding to the index that represents the existing "policy framework" (which
Is
Somewhat surprisingly, the index value for rule of law in CEE countries is not as low (relative to the EU average)
as one  would be tempted to  expect. It is likely that this  reflects  the way  in which  this indicator is constructed.
Johnson and Sheehy emphasize both excessive regulation as well as well-defined property rights.25
adopts the value that appears under the heading 'scenarios'). The EU average country is assumed  to behave as
determined  by the current  EU Average  growth  determinant  values  (see Table 6).
Table 9: Components of the Index Z.
Degree  of  Fiscal  Monetary  Price  Rule  Average
Openness  Policy  &  Policy  &  other  System  of
Size  of  Financial  Sector Distortion  Law
Government  Policies
EU Average  4.52  2.45  4.11  4.11  3.93  3.82
Czech  Republic  4.50  3.00  4.50  3.50  4.50  4.00
Hungary  3.00  2.50  3.00  3.50  3.50  3.10
Poland  3.00  2.75  2.00  3.50  3.50  2.95
Slovakia  4.00  2.25  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.05
Slovenia  2.00  2.75  3.50  2.50  2.50  2.65
CEE  Average  3.30  2.65  3.20  3.20  3.40  3.15
Note: The Index of Policy  Z for CEE countries  is based  on the original  IEF  Index while the EU Average  is based on
the Modified  IEF Index.
Difference in Growth Paths
The goal in this sub-section is to identify how much higher is the growth rate of GDP per
capita of CEE countries vis-a-vis that of the EU average country and, in particular, the behavior
of the difference in growth rates under alternative scenarios. These "differential" growth paths
are calculated solving iteratively equation [xv] in Appendix 4. As before, we assume in these




Our analysis  is based on differences  in growth  rates of per capita GDP.  To obtain  the growth  rate  of the economy
we must add  the growth  rate of the labor  force  (about  half a percentage  point  a year)  and the EU  growth  rate  of GDP
per capita (say, for example, 1.5  percentage  points  a year). The EU growth  rate of GDP per capita can be viewed  as
reflecting the exogenously  given technological  progress and the growth that results from the current growth
determinants  of the EU average country.  Given our current  coefficient  estimates,  the latter  explains  growth rates in
the EU average  country  of about one percentage  point.26
Two different growth paths are presented in Figure 3; the EU Average growth path and
the Optimal growth path. These paths are constructed using the growth determinants presented in
Table 6 and following the assumptions described in the notes to Figure 3. Both are compared to
the benchmark  that results  from  assuming  CEE countries  maintain their  own current growth
determinant levels. We refer to this benchmark as the Current Trend.
Figure 3: Differences in Growth Paths for CEE Countries vis-a-vis the EU Average.
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Scenario Assumptions: In all these growth paths we assume the European Community maintains the current EU
average  levels of  each growth  determinant (i.e., the  values for the  EU  Average  in Table  6). Thus, we  need to
compare how these fare relative to the growth determinant values of each CEE country. The Current Trend growth
path assumes each CEE country maintains the same growth determinant values that it currently has (see Table 6 for
the actual values). The growth path based on the EU Average is equivalent to the concept of absolute convergence
(i.e., CEE countries have the same growth determinants than the EU Average and only differences in initial levels of
output per capita matter).  The Optimal path assumes  CEE countries have (i) a  "policy  framework" index at the
observed maximum of 4.7 which corresponds to the value of the index for Hong Kong; (ii) no labor force growth, as
is approximately the case for Hungary; and (iii) a level of human capital equal to the EU High. In addition, this path
assumes an investment level equal to 30 percent of GDP.
* What main conclusions can be reachedfrom  the results in Figure 3?
EUAverage  Growth Path: From the results in Figure 3 we can conclude that the Czech
Republic,  Hungary,  and  Slovakia  are  individually  following  a  growth path  (i.e., their  own
Current Trend path) which is better than the EU Average growth path (i.e., the path they would27
register if they adopt the growth determinants of the EU average country). Worth highlighting is
the case for the Czech Republic which is significantly above the EU average country. This must
be attributed  to its  high value for the Index Z  and the high levels  of investment in physical
capital. By contrast, the worst performer  is Poland whose Current Trend path is significantly
below the EU Average growth path. However, it is important to highlight that the average level
of investment in Poland for the years  1994-95 was extremely low (slightly above 17 percent of
GDP), thus negatively affecting our results.
Optimal Growth Path: This path assumes CEE countries pursue (and achieve) some very
ambitious goals (i.e., an investment level equal to thirty percent of GDP; a value of the index
representing the policy framework of the economy of 4.7 which corresponds to the value for
Hong Kong; no labor force growth, as is presently the case for Hungary; and a level of human
capital equal to the EU High). In such case the growth of CEE countries is initially, on average,
approximately four percentage points higher than that of the EU average country, and decreases
to approximately two and one-half percentage points after 30 years. As mentioned in Table 7, in
these scenarios convergence to 75 percent of the EU Average income per capita is reduced to a
range between  10 and 20 years, the lowest of which corresponds to the Czech Republic and the
highest represents Poland's case.
VI.  Lessons for CEE Countries.
The results presented in the previous section denote both the challenge that lies ahead for
CEE countries as well as the opportunity these countries have to implement policies conducive to
growth. As was discussed, convergence to 75 percent of the EU average country (i.e., assuming
the EU continues to perform at the present EU Average levels) will currently take, depending on
the country, between  15 years and  9 decades. The sole exception is Poland which might  not
converge. These slow convergence estimates seem also in tune with the experience of the poorest
current EU members (see Table 2) and should be attributed to the present features of some CEE
countries. Among them, (i) low levels of investment; (ii) high rates of labor force growth; (iii)
levels  of  human  capital  which,  although  relatively  high,  are  negatively  affected  by  the28
dislocations resulting from the profound transformation of these economies and have resulted in
acute  structural unemployment  problems; and  (iv)  an  economic policy,  regulatory,  and legal
framework which is not as conducive to the effectiveness of inputs in the production process as it
could potentially be. However, many of these growth determinants may be expected to evolve in
a positive fashion in the next few years. For example, the extremely low levels of investment
registered in recent years should not be the norm in the near future as the economic uncertainties
that characterize stabilization periods dissipate.
*Are there any lessons for  CEE countries?
Yes. If CEE countries implement policies conducive to enhancing the functioning of the
market mechanism, then they would be able to improve upon the current bleak prospects while
reaching the most promising convergence and growth results described in Table 7 and Figure 3.
In particular, these countries should emphasize those aspects that  stimulate economic growth;
that is an environment conducive to investment and supportive of human capital development,
including the policy framework in which this type of capital operates.
* What does the  experience of  successful countries  (i.e., those that register  high per  capita
growth rates) show?
First, in order to stimulate the investment decisions of private economic agents there is a
need to provide a macro framework where price stability is a key goal (see, for example, Thomas
and Leipziger, 1995). Thus, it is in these countries'  own interest to ensure that monetary policy
and fiscal policy are conducive to this stability. Also, and to avoid unexpected imbalances with
potentially  far-reaching  implications,  the  sectoral  policies  must  support  the  long-run
sustainability  of  a  country's  macro  framework  by  providing  the  appropriate  economic
fundamentals. For example, price stability may not be guaranteed if the financial sector in CEE
countries is not  transformed  so as to reduce  the cost  of credit  while enhancing the  banking
regulation and supervision capabilities of monetary authorities. Second, government policy also
has  a  role  in  providing  infrastructure  and  an  environment  conducive  to  human  capital29
development.  However, these  should aim at enhancing  the  development opportunities  of the
private sector since, otherwise, they are prone to be abused. Finally, and encompassing all of the
above,  the  policy  framework  should  aim  at  enhancing  the  effectiveness  of  inputs  in  the
production  process.  For  example,  the quality  of  human  capital  is  in  our  view  essential  for
economic growth, but must also be accompanied by the appropriate policy, regulatory, and legal
framework. In particular, as shown through the empirical  results  in this paper, monetary and
fiscal policy, the rule of law, the reliance on the price system as an allocation mechanism, and the
openness to trade are all key determinants of economic growth.
In sum, given that CEE countries are well endowed with natural resources and high levels
of human capital, they face a unique opportunity to complement these "fixed" environments with
growth enhancing "variable" environments (i.e., what we have referred to as growth determinants).
They, however, still face serious policy deficiencies and, though the transformation process has
been steadfastly  and  courageously  implemented --particularly  when evaluated  relative to  the
challenges these economies faced in the early  1990s--, the remaining reform agenda is still an
enormous  task  to  be  tackled  and  accomplished.  Those  countries that  drag  their  feet in  the
implementation of the pending reform agenda (i.e., financial sector reform, pension reform, and
other sectoral deficiencies) will only compromise their growth prospects and curtail the potential
net benefits that may be derived from the EU accession process. In this respect, our paper arrives to
conclusions similar to those in other empirical growth equation models, such as Barro (1991) and
Sachs and  Warner (1996). Its  theoretical foundation allows  a  more rigorous interpretation by
linking the effectiveness of human capital in the production process to the overall policy framework
in which this capital operates. At the same time, it serves to tie the performance of countries to their
different steady state levels and, in particular, to examine the role of public policy in determining
those differences.30
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APPENDIX 1: Derivation of the Growth Equation.
The model represented by equation [1] through  [3] in the main body of this paper can be rewritten in its
intensive form (i.e., in per capita terms) as
y  =  ka  h'  [i]
k  skY-  (a  +  n  +  a)  k  [ii]
and
h  =  Sh  Y  - (a +  n  +  a)  h  [iii]
where y, h, and k are output, human capital, and physical capital expressed in effective labor units (i.e., the number
of units per person scaled by the economy's  technology  level). We define n as the rate of growth of the labor force
and a as the exogenously given rate of technological progress. The growth rate of GDP in effective labor units may
be written as
y  =  +  h  [iv]
y  k  h
which can be expressed using equation [ii] and equation [iii] as
dIn  y  =  a  [Sk  e(a"l) In  k  ep In h  - (a + n + a)] +  P [Sh  ea In  k  e(P-1)  In h  - (a + n + a)]  . [v]
A log-linearization of the above dynamic system in the neighborhood of the steady state allows to specify
the growth rate of the economy (in effective labor units) as represented by
d  =  [a  (a-l)  Sk  ko'-  ho  +  aP  Sh  ka  h~'](Ilnk  - Ink*)
+  [a  Sk  ka-  h'  +  3 (3-1)  Sh  ka  hW-] (In  h  - In h*)
where the * denotes the steady state values. Solving for the steady state in equations [ii] and [iii], the above equation
may be rewritten as
din  y"  - (1-a-P)(a  + n  + a)(alnk  - alnk*+Plnh  - ,Blnh*)
dt
or
dln  Y  =  --  - )(a  + n + a)  In(-Ži
dt  \Pl  Y*).33
Defining  g = In  y, g* = In  y*, andqc =  (1-ac-f3)  (a  +  n  +  a), then we may  write
g  =  - pg  +  (pg*
which is a linear differential  equation.  This first-order  differential  equation  has a very simple solution  which,  after
subtracting  In y(O)  and dividing  both sides by the number of years t that correspond  to the period being analyzed,
may be written  as
Iny(t)  - lny(O)  e  1  - en  [  y(0)  +  In y]  [vi]
t  t
The above  equation  specifies  the growth rate of GDP per effective  labor of any country  as dependent  on the natural
logarithm  of both the initial level of GDP per effective  labor  as well as the steady  state level of GDP per effective
labor (i.e., respectively,  In y(O)  and In y*). In sum, the farther away the economy  is from its own steady  state level
the higher  is the growth  rate, with (p  being the convergence  coefficient.
The question that remains to be answered  is what determines  the steady state level of GDP per effective
labor  (i.e.,  y*). We know the steady state  values  are given by
Sk  Sh  ek  Sbt
k*  Sk  Sh 1and  h*  =  -_  s  -
La  +nal  La +n+] 
Since  y *  k *  h  ,then  we can define the natural log of the steady state value of output as
lny*  (  +)  ln  (a  +  n  +  a)  +  n  Sk  +  l  ln  Sh  [Vii]
Using equation  [vi], equation  [vii], and our proxy for investment  in human capital (i.e., equation  [4] in the
main body of this paper),  the model  estimated  may  be written as
Iny(t)  -Iny(O)  e1  - e  t  In  l  (O)  a  In  Sk  +  In h
t  t  1  - a-  ,  I  I  +  cc
+  lnZ  (acc  )  In(a  +n  +a)l  +  T  + E
I  -a  -t p  - ,
where x is a constant and E is the residual assumed  to have a normal distribution  with mean zero and constant
variance.  Since y=Y/(A  N) is the output  per effective  labor  units,  we may rewrite  the above equation  as
Iny(t)-lny(O)=  I  In!  A(t)  +  1  - e 1 F-lny(o)±+  In  Sk +  Innh
t  t  A(O)  t  [  1  - a  -I  1-  a  - 1
+  InZ  - (cc +  I)  (a +n  +a  ±  +  T  +  £  [viii]
1-a  -rD  1 -a-f  (  J34
where y  =  Y / N  is GDP  per capita.  Notice  that
I  A(t)  [!  InCAf=a
since A(t)  = A(O) eat .Thus,  equation  [viii]  may be rewritten  as
lf'(t)  ln5'(O)=% 0 +%1 In y(O)+% 2 In Sk+X 3 Inh+X4 InZ+X5 in(3  +n  Ia)+n.  [ix]
The constant  term yo includes  the exogenously  given technological  progress growth rate  --common  to all
countries--  and the term with the proportionality  factory. Also, y(O)  is equal to y(O)  by assuming  that the initial
technology  level A(O)  is the same  for each country  and normalizing  it to one. Alternatively,  each country  could be
thought  to have a common  level of initial  technology  plus a country  specific  random  shock (e.g., due to differences
in geographical  locations  and natural resource endowments).  Thus, we normalize the common  level to one and
incorporate  the country specific shock into the residual (i.e., we replace  £  in equation [ix] for 6', which is also
assumed  to be normally  distributed  with  mean zero  and constant  variance).35
APPENDIX 2: Estimation.
This  appendix  starts by  discussing three  main  econometric  problems  that  arise  in most  estimations of
economic growth  equations. Following this  discussion we present our estimation results, both those  that use  the
Original IEF Index as well as those which are based in the Modified IEF Index.
Econometric Problems
Estimation of economic growth equations with cross-section data might be affected by the non-compliance
of  some  key  OLS  assumptions  of  which  three  are  worth  discussing.  First,  some  of  the  regressors  are  highly
correlated, a usual problem with economic data. Thus, there is the risk that our coefficient estimates become unstable
and imprecise. The same holds for the standard errors of the estimates. However, it is important to highlight that the
potential multicollinearity of right hand side variables seems not to affect the statistical or economic significance of
the coefficient estimates. In fact, though the initial level of GDP per capita has a partial correlation slightly above 0.7
with both  investment  as  well  as  human  capital,  the  addition of  these  variables  improves  the  overall fit  of  the
regression  and  the  statistical  significance  of  the  coefficient  estimates.  Also,  a  test  is conducted  regarding  the
redundancy of the  index Z in our regressions. The null hypothesis that the coefficient of this  regressor is equal to
zero (i.e.,  X 4 =  0) is rejected in all cases. The use of one sole index comprising different policy indicators eliminates
the potential risk of multicollinearity which could  exist if we used different regressors for each individual policy
indicator.
Second, since the cross-section data presented relates countries with small GDP per capita levels with those
that have large levels, there is a risk that the variance of the residuals denotes the presence  of heteroskedasticity.
However, the White test for heteroskedasticity was conducted and the null hypotheses of  constant variance in the
residuals was accepted. Although the key coefficient estimates do not vary significantly when Guyana and Zambia
are excluded from the estimation, it does lead to the rejection of our test for constant variance of residuals. Future
research will exclude these countries from the estimation and deal with its econometric implications.
Third, the national accounts data being used might  present serious measurement errors.  In particular, the
data on initial GDP level might be reflecting a temporary trough in the level of economic activity. As a result, the
presence of convergence might be overestimated and reflect cyclical components. Nonetheless, as Barro discusses
(1991), these business-cycle fluctuations affect, over long periods, only in negligible amounts the computed annual
average growth rates. It could also be the case that the regressors are not independent of the errors, thus violating a
key assumption of OLS estimation and resulting in biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. To control for these
two possibilities, a two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation is performed using as instrumental variable --besides
all other regressors which act as their  own instruments-- a  lagged initial level of  GDP per capita (i.e., the value
corresponding to 1960).
Estimation Using the Original IEF Index
The estimation of equation  [ix] of this appendix section using the original IEF index  leads to the results
presented  in Table A-I.  Four regression  results are reported.  The first corresponds  to an  ordinary least  squares
estimation. Note  that equation  [viii] highlights that  some  of the  estimated  coefficients should conform with the
restriction that36
X2  +  X3 X5  [xI
A Wald test of the above restriction is conducted and the null hypothesis accepted.
Table A-I: Estimation Using the IEF Index.
Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate of per Capital GDP in the Period 1965-1989.
Regression:  1  2  3  4
Estimation Method:  OLS  Restricted OLS  TSLS  Restricted TSLS
Sample Size:  85  85  84  84
Constant  0.0583  0.0790  0.0698  0.0875
(0.036)  (0.018)  (0.037)  (0.019)
In y(0)  -0.0176  -0.0173  -0.0187  -0.0184
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
In (I/GDP)  0.0147  0.0148  0.0169  0.0171
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)
In h  0.0086  0.0093  0.0086  0.0091
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)
In Z  0.0239  0.0243  0.0236  0.0238
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)
In (a+6+n)  -0.0334  - -0.0339
(0.014)  - (0.015)  -
Adjusted. R Squared  0.483  0.487  0.477  0.481
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)
Tests (F statistics reported):
Regression Not Significant  16.71  Reject  20.92  Reject  16.52  Reject  20.78  Reject
Restriction [14] is True  0.446  Accept  - 0.305  Accept  -
Z is Redundant  7.278  Reject  - 7.035  Reject
Implied Values of:
(p  0.0229  0.0231  0.0248  0.0244
a  - 0.358  - 0.383
t3  - 0.225  0.204
*  - 2.604  2.608
Note: Reported between parentheses are the standard errors.
The second regression incorporates the restriction described by [x]. Thus, we estimate
t)  Xo)+  Xny( 0)+X2In  sk+X 3 .nh  +x 4InZ-(x 2+x3 )  In (a+n+a)+  . [xi]
t37
The regression  coefficients  are non-linear  functions  of the parameters  in the growth  equation.  Thus, from equation
[ix] and the restricted  equation  [xi] we can estimate  the implied  values ofip,  a, j3,  and 4,  of which  the second  and the
third constitute  production  function  parameters.  These implied  values  are also reported  in Table  A-I.
The third regression  is the equivalent  of the first except  that we use the mentioned  two-stage  least square
(TSLS) estimation.  As mentioned before, the lagged value of the initial level of GDP per capita, as well as the
original  values of all other  regressors,  are the instrumental  variables.  The results  are tested for the compliance  with
restriction  [x]  which is accepted.  This motivates  estimating  our fourth and last regression  in this group  following  the
restricted  specification  in equation  [xi].  As before,  the implied  values of  (p,  a,  ,,  and 4  are calculated  and reported  in
the above-mentioned  table.
Estimation  Using  the Modified  IEF Index
As a minor modification,  we change  the IEF index by proposing  a different  interpretation  on the degree of
openness  of an economy.  With  respect to trade, we concentrate  not only on the tariff level, but also on the presence
of quantitative  restrictions.  As to capital  flows,  we center  the definition  of a country's openness  to capital  movements
on the presence  of exchange  rate distortions.  The latter is measured by the premium  that may exist between  the
market  and the official  exchange  rates.
Our measure  of openness of an economy  has the added advantage  of containing  time series information
since it is based on average  data for the 1970s  and 1980s.  The modification  to this component  of the IEF index is
thoroughly  explained  in Box 3 in the main body of this paper and implies a change  to 20 percent of the index. A
regression  with the openness  to trade component  in the original IEF  as the dependent  variable  against  a constant  and
the openness  component  we construct  has an R square close to 0.27 or, for that matter, a correlation  coefficient
between  both "openness" indexes  of 0.52. Thus, this component  of the IEF index can be judged to have changed
substantially  due to the construction  methodology  we propose.
Based  on this modification  we run a second  set of four regressions.  The first regression  estimates  equation
[ix].  Once again,  since a Wald test accepts the null hypothesis  presented  in equation  [x],  we run a second  regression
directly  imposing  this restriction  into the estimation  (i.e.,  we estimate  equation  [xi])  and use  these results  to calculate
the implied  values of tp,  a, j,  and 4.  The last two of the regressions  estimated  follow  the exact same steps  except  that
we use a two-stage  least square  estimation  with the instrumental  variables  previously  discussed.  The results  of these
regressions  are presented  in Table A-2.
Table A-2: Estimation Using the Modified IEF Index.
Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate of per Capital GDP in the Period 1965-1989.
Regression:  1  2  3  4
Estimation Method:  OLS  Restricted OLS  TSLS  Restricted TSLS
Sample Size:  84  84  83  83
Constant  0.0700  0.0797  0.0811  0.0879
(0.036)  (0.018)  (0.037)  (0.019)
In y(O)  -0.0179  -0.0178  -0.0191  -0.0189
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
In (I/GDP)  0.0149  0-0149  0.0169  0.016938
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)
In h  0.0095  0.0099  0.0095  0.0098
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)
In (Modified Z)  0.0251  0.0255  0.0248  0.0250
(0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)
In (a+o+n)  -0.0292  - -0.0297
(0.015)  - (0.015)
Adjusted R Squared  0.492  0.498  0.485  0.491
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)
Tests (F statistics reported):
Regression Not Significant  17.07  Reject  21.56  Reject  16.87  Reject  21.34  Reject
Restriction [14] is True  0.097  Accept  - 0.045  Accept  -
Z is Redundant  8.719  Reject  - 8.459  Reject  -
Implied Values of
(P  0.0235  0.0232  0.0255  0.0253
ra  - 0.350  - 0.372
0.232  - 0.214
.y  - 2.582  - 2.566
Note: Reported between parentheses are the standard errors.
APPENDIX  3: List of Countries  Used in Each Estimation  and Corresponding  Data.
Country  GDP per  GDP per  Average  Investment  [EF  Modified  Human  Labor  Observation in regression?
Capita  Capita  Annual  as a  Index  IEF  Capital  Force  Notes: y = yes, Blank Cell =no
1960  1965  Growth  Share of  Index  Growth  Group I  Group 2
1965-89  GDP  (a + S + n)  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4
I  South Korea  1143  1336  7.0  21.0  3.7  3.6  6.9  7.1  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
2  Singapore  2115  2340  7.0  29.2  4.7  4.7  4.1  7.1  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
3  Malta  1683  1770  6.0  23.1  3.0  3.1  6.4  5.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
4  Taiwan  1626  2105  6.0  21.3  4.1  4.0  6.1  7.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
5  Botswana  702  763  5.6  16.2  3.2  3.3  2.6  8.2  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
6  Hong Kong  2825  4330  5.5  19.8  4.8  4.7  6.6  7.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
7  Romania  500  682  5.1  28.1  2.3  - - 5.9
8  Japan  3479  5189  4.5  33.9  4.0  4.1  8.0  6.1  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
9  Indonesia  798  765  4.5  14.1  3.2  3.0  3.2  7.2  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
10  Cyprus  2494  3268  4.3  27.1  3.4  3.3  7.2  5.9  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
11  Portugal  2188  2811  4.1  22.7  3.4  3.3  3.0  5.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
12  Thailand  1221  1470  4.1  16.9  3.7  3.8  4.2  7.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
13  Malaysia  1831  2156  4.1  22.1  3.6  3.9  4.6  7.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
14  Lesotho  393  515  3.9  8.7  2.4  2.4  3.2  7.3  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
1  USSR  2830  3579  3.8  38.4  2.5  - - 6.1
16  Barbados  3293  4033  3.2  12.2  3.0  3.2  7.5  5.6  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
17  Brazil  2281  2382  3.2  19.2  2.6  2.6  3.1  7.6  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
18  Congo  1412  1367  3.2  9.5  2.2  2.6  - 7.8
19  China  704  718  3.2  19.8  2.2  2.1  - 7.0
20  Tunisia  1406  1593  3.2  14.3  3.4  3.1  1.9  7.3  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
21  Greece  2414  3519  3.2  24.5  3.2  3.2  6.4  5.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
22  Ireland  3918  4737  3.1  24.4  3.8  3.8  7.5  5.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
23  Finland  6239  7545  3.1  34.7  3.7  3.8  9.3  5.6  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
24  Italy  5214  6490  3.0  27.8  3.3  3.4  5.8  5.6  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y39
25  Cameroon  804  847  3.0  7.9  2.4  2.6  1.7  7.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
26  Norway  6443  7950  3.0  31.2  3.6  3.7  10.3  5.7  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
27  Spain  3620  5315  2.8  25.0  3.3  3.3  5.0  5.9  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
28  Austria  5783  6953  2.8  25.6  4.0  4.0  6.3  5.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
29  Canada  8720  10299  2.7  23.7  4.0  4.2  10.0  6.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
30  Jordan  1494  2072  2.7  13.3  3.2  3.2  3.3  7.1  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
31  Israel  4240  5613  2.6  25.6  3.1  2.6  8.9  7.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
32  Syria  2025  2621  2.6  14.6  1.8  1.8  3.1  8.2  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
33  Belgium  6228  7650  2.5  23.5  3.9  3.9  8.8  5.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
34  Egypt  1027  1295  2.5  4.4  2.6  2.6  - 7.4
35  France  6707  8376  2.5  27.1  3.7  3.9  5.9  5.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
36  Turkey  2043  2282  2.5  20.9  3.0  2.6  2.7  7.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
37  Dominican Rep.  1561  1667  2.5  14.3  2.6  2.5  3.7  7.7  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
38  Algeria  2207  2057  2.4  20.3  2.8  2.9  1.8  7.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
39  Colombia  2191  2356  2.2  15.8  3.0  2.8  4.2  7.6  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
40  Ecuador  1882  2056  2.2  22.0  2.9  2.5  5.0  7.9  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
41  Morocco  1050  1589  2.2  8.7  3.3  3.2  - 7.6
42  Germany  7355  8902  2.2  27.8  3.9  3.9  8.4  5.6  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
43  United Kingdom  7721  8713  2.2  18.0  4.1  4.1  8.4  5.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
44  Fiji  2772  2798  2.1  17.3  2.9  - 6.0  7.3  y  y  y  y
45  Sri Lanka  1594  1491  2.1  8.4  3.4  3.3  5.2  7.0  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
46  Australia  9160  10348  2.0  28.7  3.9  4.0  10.1  6.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
47  Netherlands  7149  8629  2.0  24.5  4.2  4.1  8.2  6.1  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
48  Mexico  3675  4355  1.9  16.4  2.7  2.6  3.8  7.7  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
49  India  956  940  1.9  13.6  2.3  2.1  2.7  7.3  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
50  Denmark  7737  9598  1.9  25.6  4.1  4.0  10.1  5.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
51  Pakistan  817  1148  1.8  10.5  3.0  2.9  1.8  8.0  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
52  Nigeria  734  811  1.8  11.7  2.8  2.7  - 7.0
53  Paraguay  1528  1655  1.8  12.3  3.4  3.0  4.5  7.9  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
54  Sweden  8530  10528  1.8  23.3  3.5  3.3  8.9  5.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
55  Swaziland  1591  2182  1.7  12.6  3.1  3.2  3.3  8.1  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
56  Kenya  876  821  1.7  15.2  3.0  2.9  2.3  9.0  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
57  United States  11713  13670  1.7  21.5  4.1  4.1  11.5  6.3  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
58  Myanmar  399  522  1.5  8.3  1.7  1.6  1.5  7.3  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
59  Switzerland  10670  12633  1.4  29.1  4.2  4.2  8.3  5.9  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
60  Burkina Faso  576  474  1.4  6.8  2.3  2.2  - 7.4
61  Philippines  1481  1616  1.2  14.9  3.1  3.2  6.0  7.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
62  CostaRica  2748  3208  1.1  15.8  3.2  2.9  4.9  8.1  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
63  Panama  2014  2579  1.1  19.2  3.6  3.9  5.8  7.7  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
64  Mali  683  559  1.1  5.9  2.9  3.0  0.6  7.3  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
65  South Africa  2740  3289  1.0  18.4  3.0  3.1  4.7  7.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
66  Malawi  493  537  1.0  9.2  2.6  2.5  2.3  7.9  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
67  Honduras  1346  1462  1.0  13.6  2.9  2.8  2.8  8.2  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
68  Chile  3593  4055  1.0  19.0  3.6  3.3  6.0  7.0  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
69  Zimbabwe  1281  1229  0.9  16.4  2.3  2.2  2.4  8.3  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
70  Uruguay  4609  4297  0.9  12.3  3.2  3.1  6.0  5.7  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
71  Bolivia  1461  1715  0.9  14.5  3.3  3.0  4.0  7.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
72  New Zealand  9527  10773  0.9  24.4  4.3  4.1  11.8  6.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
73  Bangladesh  1197  1446  0.8  3.9  2.4  2.1  1.6  7.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
74  Guatemala  2156  2312  0.7  9.0  3.2  3.1  2.3  7.9  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
75  Saudi Arabia  4957  7676  0.6  5.3  3.1  - - 9.3
76  Trinidad&Tob.  7172  8165  0.6  12.1  3.5  3.2  6.1  6.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
77  Jamaica  2238  2701  0.5  20.7  3.3  3.2  3.7  6.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
78  El Salvador  1842  2253  0.1  8.2  3.6  3.5  3.2  7.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
79  Senegal  1332  1455  0.0  5.0  2.6  2.8  2.1  7.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
80  Surinam  2603  2988  0.0  16.0  2.1  - - 6.7
81  Argentina  5273  5906  -0.1  16.5  3.4  3.2  6.4  6.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
82  Ivory Coast  1407  1770  -0.1  10.7  2.8  - - 8.7
83  Haiti  1161  1130  -0.2  4.5  1.8  2.1  1.4  6.7  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
84  Ghana  1150  1142  -0.3  5.8  2.8  2.7  2.6  7.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
85  Mauritania  997  1133  -0.3  13.9  2.2  2.1  - 7.3
86  Iran  3853  4387  -0.3  14.3  1.3  1.4  2.5  8.5  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
87  PapuaNewG.  1548  2143  -0.4  14.8  2.9  3.3  1.2  7.3  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y40
88  Peru  2576  3200  -0.6  17.4  3.0  2.8  5.2  7.7  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
89  SierraLeone  - 1396  -0.8  1.4  2.3  2.4  1.6  6.9  y  y  y  y
90  Somalia  1391  1214  -0.8  8.0  1.3  1.4  - 8.7
91  Niger  673  814  -0.9  7.9  2.3  2.7  0.5  7.7  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
92  Benin  1381  1510  -0.9  6.0  3.1  3.2  0.6  7.6  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
93  Zaire  627  705  -1.1  3.7  1.8  1.8  1.8  7.8  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
94  Venezuela  8236  9747  -1.2  17.5  2.5  2.6  4.7  8.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
95  Zambia  1246  1438  -1.5  19.0  3.1  2.9  3.5  8.1  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
96  Angola  1178  1346  -1.7  3.4  1.7  1.9  - 7.3
97  Guyana  2106  2073  -1.8  23.3  2.6  2.7  4.7  6.6  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
98  Mozambique  1448  1597  -1.9  1.8  2.0  2.2  0.9  7.4  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
99  Madagascar  1499  1401  -2.0  1.3  2.7  3.1  - 7.5
100  Nicaragua  2112  2957  -2.3  11.7  2.4  2.2  3.0  7.9  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y
APPENDIX 4: Equations Used in the Convergence and Growth Calculations.
We derive in this appendix the  equations used  in our  growth and  convergence exercises. Note  that all
calculations  presented  in the  main  body of  this  paper  assume  that  the  growth  determinants  of  the  European
Community are those that correspond to the current EU average country.
Years for Convergence
Defining L = a + n + 6, the restricted equation [xi] can be rewritten for country i as
XO  + (  +  l)  In  y; (0) + X2 In s  Xk  +  3 In h i +  X4 In Zi -(X2  + X 3)  In L
Writing the same equation for country j, subtracting one from the other, and using the fact that
I
then we can write
In  Ij(t)  -In yj(t)  =e  ' t (in y (O) -In  yj(O) )  +  (  - e-9')  t  (I  (ns'ik-In  sk)
+  I  (lnhi  -lnhi)  +  I  (InZi-inzj)  - In Z  (InLi-  nL)l  . [xii]
Thus, the difference in output levels between country i and country j may be interpreted as the weighted average of
the initial difference in GDP per capita and the  initial difference in steady state values; the  latter determined by
differences in investment, human capital, labor force growth, and policy frameworks (i.e., the term between square
brackets in the above equation).
If country i and j have the same steady state, then the above equation reduces to41
In Yi (  t)  = e-'' '  In  Y (°  -)  [xiii]
Since the initial value of GDP is known for each country, then setting a target for the left hand side of the equation
allows to solve for the number of years t required to achieve it. For example, assume  i is the poorest of the two
countries. Let
y1(O)  =  yj(O)
and set the target for time t at
y (t)  =  - yj (t)  [xiv]
Replacing into equation [xiii] and using the value of (p  that has been estimated (i.e., approximately 0.0248), we can
conclude that a country which initially has a GDP per capita equal to one fourth of that of another will take 63 years
to reach the target set in equation [xiv]. Equation [xiii] may also be used to calculate the years it would take for CEE
countries to converge to a certain income per capita target when we assume countries have different steady state
levels. This is the type of convergence exercise we discuss in Section V of this paper.
Differential Growth Rates
Rewriting equation [xi] for country i and ceuntry j and subtracting one from the other we have
In y(t)  -In  Ij(O)  - (1n 5j(t)  -In  5J0)  (
t  t  J  t  t  J  ~~~~~~~~=  Xi  (In  yi (0)  - In  yj (0))
+  %2 (in  skL-  In sjk) +  X 3 (In hi  -ln h)  + % 4 (n  Zi -In Zj)  - (X2  + X 3)  (In Li -In Li)  [xv]
which is the difference in the per capita growth rates between country i and country j.  Assuming country j adopts
the values that correspond to the EU average country, we can then determine how much higher or lower is the per
capita growth rate of CEE countries by solving iteratively equation [xv]. If we are interested in the total real growth
rate of the economy, then we should add to what is determined by the above equation the growth rate of the labor
force (say, on average, half a percentage point a year) and the growth registered by country j (e.g.,  1.5 percentage
points a year). The growth of country j can be assumed to be the result of exogenous technological progress.
APPENDIX 5: Individual Convergence Scenarios.
The convergence exercises in Table A-3 assume that all except one of the growth determinants remain at
each  country's  current  levels (see  Table  6 for  information  on  these  levels). This table  allows  to  examine the
implications of  each  growth  determinant  for a  country's  convergence prospects.  Take for example  the case  of
Poland. The value of the index that represents the policy framework is crucial in determining if this country will or
will not converge. For other countries, convergence might be cut in more than half depending on the existing policy
framework on which they operate. Another factor crucial in determining the years required for convergence is the
rate of growth of the  labor force, though it is less clear which  policies the governments of CEE countries could
pursue in this regard to strengthen a country's growth performance. However, one should expect countries with high
"fertility" rates (i.e., including the depreciation rate and the rate of technological progress) and low levels of human
capital to be among the worst performers.42
In other cases convergence requires important improvements from the current levels of  investment. Once
again, the most notable  case is that of Poland. However, its poor prospect derives from a combination of factors;
particularly  low  investment  levels  and  low  value of  the  index  representing  the  policy  framework,  and  is also
worsened by a high rate of growth of the labor force and the fact that this country is notably below the other CEE
countries in terms of initial GDP per capita (see Table 6). In sum, the higher the investment level, the higher the
Index Z (i.e., policy framework), the lower the labor force growth rate, and the higher the human capital level, the
more rapidly will convergence take place.
Table A-3: Years for Convergence. Individual Scenarios.
Investment Scenarios (as a percentage of GDP).  Human Capital Scenarios (average years of education).
CEE Mean  17.5  20.0  22.5  25.0  27.5  30.0  CEE Mean  7  8  9  10  11  12
Czech Rep.  17  24  20  17  15  14  13  Czech Rep.  15  18  16  15  14  14  13
Hungary  40  61  47  40  35  31  29  Hungary  41  55  48  43  40  37  35
Poland  68  ###  96  67  55  47  42  Poland  ###  ###  ##4  ###  ###  173  110
Slovakia  52  133  68  52  43  37  33  Slovakia  41  57  48  43  39  36  34
Slovenia  78  ###  168  77  58  48  42  Slovenia  91  ###  ###  111  83  69  61
Index of Structural Framework  Scenarios.  Fertility Scenarios  (in percent).
CEE Mean  3.00  3.50  4.00  4.33  4.67  5.00  CEE Mean 5.0%  5.2% 5.4%  5.6%  5.8%  6.0%
Czech Rep.  23  25  18  15  13  12  11  Czech Rep.  15  13  14  15  16  17  18
Hungary  40  44  33  27  25  23  21  Hungary  49  42  46  51  57  65  75
Poland  138  ###  71  49  42  37  33  Poland  235  90  123  ###  ###  ###  ###
Slovakia  38  42  31  26  23  21  20  Slovakia  38  33  36  39  42  47  52
Slovenia  47  54  37  30  27  24  23  Slovenia  96  67  81  107  ###  ###  ###
Notes:  ### denotes no convergence and implies that the country never reaches 75 percent of the EU average level
of income per capita (i.e., the steady state of this  country is below this threshold). Recall that fertility rates have
from the outset a joint 5 percent level which represents the depreciation rate and the rate of exogenous technological
progress (see Box 2 for a more thorough discussion of this topic).
Scenario Assumptions:  In  all scenarios  the  "average"  EU  country  to which  CEE countries  are  converging  is
assumed to behave  as the  EU Average values presented  in Table 6.  The column titled CEE Mean assumes the
growth determinant values that correspond to the average of all five CEE countries. The next columns introduce
variations to each of the growth determinants mentioned (i.e., clockwise, investment, human capital, index Z, and
fertility rates). All other growth determinants remain at the levels that correspond to each country, the sole exception
being human capital which, when fixed, is assumed to remain constant at the CEE Mean level (i.e., 9.6 years).Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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